to everyone from large corporate enterprises to home computer users. There are more security conferences than I can keep track of, let alone attend, and enough publications to fill a library. Thirty-six universities have been declared Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, and numerous companies offer training in computer and network security and forensics. There are professional societies devoted to security, and certification programs for security technologies, operating environments, and security professionals. Information security has become a topic of conversation at board meetings and social gatherings. It is a priority in business and government. It has led to new laws and regulations, and to new policies and procedures for handling information.
It is on the agenda of Congress, the President, and international bodies.
In recent years, governments have become particularly concerned with protecting critical infrastructures from physical and cyber attacks. In 1996, the Clinton Administration formed the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP). The PCCIP was tasked to study the critical infrastructures that constitute the life support systems of the nation, determine their vulnerabilities to a wide range of threats, and propose a strategy for protecting them in the future. Eight infrastructures were identified: telecommunications, banking and finance, electrical power, oil and gas distribution and storage, water supply, transportation, emergency services, and government services. Their recommendations led to several initiatives discussed later in this chapter.
While much of the focus at the national policy level has been on protecting critical infrastructures, cyber security is vital to much more. Information technology is woven into practically all business processes and control systems. Cyber attacks have real-world consequences that impact the economy and our daily lives.
To address today's threats to information-based systems, security has evolved from the simple access controls of 30 years ago to a complete infrastructure in its own right. This infrastructure serves to protect computers and networks, and the information that is generated, acquired, processed, transmitted, and stored by them. Like many of the systems it protects, the security infrastructure is global and interconnected. It is growing and evolving, and will continue to do so as long as information technology itself evolves.
The objective of this chapter is to explore this emergent infrastructure and the factors that are shaping its development. The focus is on cyber security, which includes computer security and network security, but excludes those aspects of information security that deal with information that is not computerized (e.g., print media).
The factors shaping the development of the security infrastructure are divided into five areas: threats, technology developments, economic factors, psychological factors, and social and political factors. These areas will be discussed after first describing the elements of security infrastructure.
Limitations of space preclude giving more than a broad overview of the topics.
Many issues are ignored or brushed over lightly. Further, more attention is paid to developments in the United States than elsewhere. The aim is a conceptual framework for understanding the state of security today rather than complete coverage of all the pieces of the framework.
THE CYBER SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE
The cyber security infrastructure consists of those elements involved in the protection of networked computers and information from cyber threats. The objective is to deter, prevent, detect, recover from, and respond to threats in cyberspace. The threats take a variety of forms and include unauthorized access to or use of information resources, and computer network attacks that deny, disrupt, degrade, or destroy information and network resources. They include theft of information, computer viruses and worms, defacement of web sites, denial-of-service attacks, computer and network penetrations, and sabotage or fabrication of data. The security infrastructure serves to protect against these threats and ensure the confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, and availability of data.
The security infrastructure includes information technology, procedures and practices, laws and regulations, and people and organizations. These areas are interrelated and impact each other. Developments in technology, for example, can lead to new procedures and practices, new laws or regulations, and the formation of new security companies. Each is discussed briefly below.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Information technology consists of the hardware and software used to generate, acquire, process, distribute, and store information. Of interest here are technologies that serve to protect cyberspace from attack through prevention, detection, investigation, and recovery.
Prevention technologies include authentication systems (e.g., passwords, biometrics, and smart cards), encryption systems (for scrambling data and network communications), access controls, firewalls, vulnerability scanners, and security management systems.
Detection and investigation technologies include auditing and intrusion/misuse detection systems, anti-viral tools, honey pots for trapping and studying intruders, trace back mechanisms for determining the origin of an attack, and computer and network forensic tools for handling and processing evidence. Technologies for recovery include backup systems.
None of the technologies offers a "silver bullet" for security. They all have their limits. Encryption, for example, can protect e-mail from snoops, but not from viruses or spam attacks. Security is possible only through a combination of controls coupled with good management and operating practices, supporting laws, and effective law enforcement -in short, the security infrastructure. Even then, security is never foolproof.
Further, some security technologies are also employed as attack technologies.
Password crackers and software tools that scan networks for vulnerabilities are good examples. While system owners use them to find and fix their own problems, their adversaries use them to find security holes, which are then exploited in an attack.
Technology standards play an important role in security. They establish baseline requirements for security and promote interoperability between devices that need to communicate. A good example is the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol. SSL is implemented in web browsers and servers, and used to encrypt confidential data such as credit card numbers that are transmitted between a user's browser and a web site.
Standards have a downside as well. The TCP/IP protocols, which are the foundation of the Internet, facilitate massive attacks against large numbers of computers.
That so many of the computers are running the same software (e.g., versions of Microsoft Windows, Linux, and Unix) further aggravates the problems.
PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES
These relate to the management of security and information technology. They include "best practices" for developing, installing, and operating computers and networks so as to minimize security vulnerabilities and risks. Best practices have been developed in areas such as selecting and managing passwords, deploying firewalls, configuring and upgrading systems, and planning for and responding to security incidents. 1 Good management practices are at least as crucial to security as deploying security technology. Most outsider attacks, perhaps all but one or two percent, exploit known vulnerabilities that could have been avoided by system administrators and users.
Humans are often the weak link. They make mistakes, pick weak passwords, and are vulnerable to social engineering (being conned by attackers into providing passwords or access to systems, for example). They develop software with security flaws and open virus-laden e-mail attachments from strangers.
LAWS AND REGULATIONS
In the United States and elsewhere, it is illegal to access a computer or information stored on a computer or transmitted over a network without authorization and with intent to defraud, trespass, or cause damage to data or systems. It is also illegal to traffic in passwords or similar access codes. Such activity is covered at the federal level by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 and subsequent amendments, and by various other federal and state laws. However, not all countries criminalize these activities, and those that do may not have consistent laws.
A second set of laws and regulations regulate the investigation of cyber attacks and threats by law enforcement and intelligence officers. These include laws for acquiring data about a subject of investigation from third parties, intercepting a subject's communications, and searching and seizing a subject's computing devices.
A third class of laws and regulations mandate security for certain systems. In the United States, the Office of Management and Budget requires federal agencies to conduct security certifications of systems that process sensitive information or perform critical support systems. Such requirements do not, however, apply to the private sector, which is generally unregulated with respect to security. One exception is the Health Information Portability Accountability Act (HIPAA), which specifies security and privacy requirements for systems that handle patient records. However, many private sector organizations impose internal security policies on their IT operations.
A fourth set of laws and regulations restrict trade in information security technologies. For example, certain encryption technologies are subject to export controls although these controls have been substantially lifted in recent years.
PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS
The security infrastructure includes individuals and organizations with an interest in security. Both formal and informal organizations participate, including government agencies, corporations, educational institutions, professional societies, non-profit organizations, research communities, standards committees, international bodies, and consortia. Some groups come together temporarily for a specific purpose, for example, to participate in a security-related seminar, workshop, or meeting. Groups can operate domestically or internationally, and meet physically, virtually, or both. Many use the Internet, especially e-mail and the web, to facilitate their activities, collaborate with others, and reach a broader audience.
The people and organizations participating in the security infrastructure perform a variety of different functions. These include education and training, research, publication, product development and marketing, network security administration, security support services, policy and standards making, law enforcement, and research funding.
None of these parties "owns" the security infrastructure. However, individuals and organizations are responsible for the security of their own systems. Governments are not responsible for the security of systems in the private sector, but they can influence the security of those systems through laws and regulations (e.g., HIPAA), public-private partnerships, research programs and grants, and other efforts.
Participants in the security infrastructure constitute a loosely structured network.
Organizationally, this network resembles an all-channel or full matrix network 2 where everyone is connected to everyone else through the Internet (and other communications media). There is no central command or headquarters for the network as a whole and decision-making takes place across the network. When a major security incident affecting multiple organizations occurs, as with a major virus outbreak, many participants in the security network respond simultaneously to the attack, issuing alerts, releasing software tools and upgrades, reconfiguring systems, and hunting down the attacker. Even though organizations are responsible only for protecting their own systems, they can draw upon the network for products, services, standards, training, and other types of assistance. We now turn to the factors shaping the security infrastructure.
CYBER THREATS
A major force behind the security infrastructure is the real and perceived threat of cyber attacks. After briefly reviewing the characteristics of the threat, we will summarize some of the incident data showing the prevalence of the threat.
THREAT CHARACTERISTICS
Cyber threats are characterized by an attacker, a target system, a set of actions against the target, and the consequences resulting from the attack, including damages to the target, The category of criminals generally refers to persons who attack systems for money. They steal credit card numbers, identities, and intellectual property. They siphon money from bank accounts and extort their victims by threatening to expose stolen secrets or cause serious cyber damage. They operate alone, in concert with insiders, and through organized crime rings.
So far, terrorists are using the Internet primarily to support their physical operations rather than to launch cyber attacks. There have been a few incidents of hackers affiliated with or at least sympathetic to terrorist causes engaging in typical hacker-type activity such as web defacements and denial-of-service attacks. 4 For example, after the September 11 attacks, one group of Muslim hackers defaced U.S. per week to 32 attacks per week. From this data, they projected an annual growth rate of 64% in attack activity. 13 The majority of attacks came from the United States and its allies. Less than 1% of the attacks came from countries on the U.S. cyber terrorism watch list. There were no attacks from Iraq, Libya, N. Korea, or Syria.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TRENDS
Developments in technology shape the security infrastructure both directly and indirectly.
The direct impact comes from technologies that enable new or improved security tools and services. The indirect impact results from technologies that aggravate the threat, thereby leading to actions that enhance security. This section briefly reviews three trend areas: ubiquity, power, and vulnerability.
UBIQUITY
Information technology is becoming increasingly pervasive and connected. It is spreading throughout our offices, homes, automobiles, and elsewhere. It is being integrated into everything from appliances and vehicles to business processes and control systems. It resides in both fixed and mobile devices. Software moves through the networks, carrying computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and other forms of malicious code.
This trend toward ubiquitous computing affects information security in two ways.
First, there are more targets to attack and more people attacking them. Second, attacks can have real-world consequences. The Code Red worm, for example, led to the delay of 55 Japan Airlines flights after shutting down a computer used for ticketing and checkin. 14 Another incident that took place in early 2000 led to loss of wildlife and environmental damage. In that case, a 49-year-old Brisbane man allegedly penetrated the Maroochy Shire Council's waste management system and used radio transmissions to alter pump station operations. A million litres of raw sewage spilled into public parks and creeks on Queensland's Sunshine Coast, killing marine life, turning the water black, and creating an unbearable stench. Evidently, the man was angry about being rejected for a council job. He had formerly worked for the company that had installed the system, which gave him inside knowledge and the software needed to conduct the attack.
15
Approximately 3,000 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems control critical infrastructures such as the power grid, dams, and pipelines. 16 Many of these systems have very poor security. In the past, this did not matter much, because the systems were arcane and isolated. Increasingly, however, they are controlled through networks based on the Internet protocols, potentially making them more open to attack.
The proliferation of mobile computing devices has extended an organization's network security perimeter from the workplace to homes, airports, automobiles, and hotel rooms. Information once confined to office networks can make its way to home PCs, laptop computers, and hand held devices, which may be less protected physically as well as virtually. Each year, tens of thousands of laptops are reported lost or stolen, many with extremely sensitive information, including government classified information.
Organizations are installing wireless networks with little regard for security.
Using a technique called "war driving," hackers drive around cities looking for unprotected networks. When one is found, they can access the network to read corporate communications or simply use the network as they would their own. A seven-month audit sponsored by the International Chamber of Commerce found that 92% of the 5,000
wireless networks in London were vulnerable to casual attacks. 17 Network operators had either not turned on the security features or else used them with default settings that were not secure. At the same time, high bandwidth data pipes and increased network traffic can make it more difficult to monitor networks for intrusions and other forms of abuse and to intercept particular traffic in support of a criminal investigation or foreign intelligence operation. Higher capacity disks make it more time consuming to scan disks for malicious code and conduct computer forensics examinations.
The relative lag of processor improvements to those of storage and networks could aggravate the challenges, although multiprocessor supercomputers and distributed computing can be used to compensate. A distributed approach is already used by many network-based intrusion detection systems and to break encryption keys in criminal investigations. Breakthrough processor technologies such as quantum and DNA computing might also counter the lag, but these technologies represent long-term solutions and can also benefit the adversary.
Attack tools have become more powerful as developers build on each other's work and program their own knowledge into the tools. 20 The Nimda worm combined features from several previous viruses and worms in order to create a powerful worm that spread by four channels: e-mail, Web downloads, file sharing, and active scanning for and infection of vulnerable Web servers. The advanced distributed denial of service tools have sophisticated command and control capabilities that allow an attacker to direct the actions of potentially thousands of previously compromised "zombie" computers. The zombies carry out the actual attack, using various techniques to thwart tracing.
Many attack tools are simple to use. "Script kiddies" and others with malicious intent but little skill can download the tools and launch destructive attacks without even understanding how the tools work. E-mail worms can be constructed with windowsbased software such as the VBS Worm Generator. All the attacker needs to do is type in a subject line and message body for the e-mail message carrying the worm and check a few boxes.
Improvements in hardware and software have also benefited security. Advances in artificial intelligence, data mining, and distributed processing have furthered the development of intrusion and misuse detection, for example.
VULNERABILITIES
One might think that over time, security would get better and systems would be less vulnerable to attack. While this is true for some software, overall, the state of security has gotten worse as witnessed by the increases in attacks and also vulnerabilities.
Vulnerabilities arise in two places: first, in the products themselves, and second, in the way they are installed and used. With respect to the first, the number of product vulnerabilities reported to CERT/CC has more than doubled annually in the past few years (see Figure 2 ). In 1998, CERT/CC received reports of 262 vulnerabilities or less than 1 a day. By 2001, this was up to 2,437 or almost 7 a day. These security holes can be attributed to several factors, including growth in the size and number of software products, inadequate attention to security and reliability during the software development process, and unanticipated side effects and interactions among different products.
With respect to the second source of vulnerabilities, products are frequently Internet vulnerabilities. 21 At the top of the list was default installs of operating system and applications. Functions were enabled that were not needed and had security flaws.
Second on the list were accounts with no passwords or weak ones.
This trend in vulnerabilities has been shaping the security infrastructure. It has created a market for reports about vulnerabilities and how to correct them. In addition, it is leading software developers to find ways of developing more robust software. In when they can get access to source code, and they may decide to exploit the problems they find rather than report them. Moreover, making the code available to public scrutiny does not mean anyone will in fact study it closely. On balance, whether a system is open or closed might not matter much in terms of security. 24 Security might be affected more by the priority and practices of the vendor.
ECONOMIC FACTORS
The economic factors shaping the security infrastructure can be analyzed in terms of three groups of people: buyers, sellers, and donors. Buyers pursue security primarily to avoid economic losses. Sellers, on the other hand, see security as a business opportunity and way of making money. Finally, donors, who are predominantly government agencies, see security as a national issue worthy of funding.
ECONOMIC LOSSES
Organizations invest in security to avoid or at least contain the damages that result from an attack. These damages can include the cost of investigating and responding to an attack (e.g., clearing out viruses and restoring data), lost revenue and employee productivity from system down time, lost business due to lost credibility and customer confidence, and litigation costs. Company stocks can also drop following press reports of certain types of incidents. A study of the economic effect of information security incidents conducted at the University of Maryland found a significant negative stock market reaction to security breaches involving unauthorized access to confidential data.
Interestingly, there was no significant market reaction for other types of incidents (e.g., web site defacements and denial-of-service attacks). 25 Finally, some companies have million. 28 These losses represented 223 companies (out of 503 responding to the survey),
for an average loss of over $2 million. Whether any of these numbers is accurate or not matters less for security than that they are being used to justify the expenditure of more resources to solve security problems.
Ideally, security would be free, fast, and foolproof. In practice, it is never all three, and companies need to make hard choices about how much to spend and what to spend it on. In determining security expenditures, a reasonable goal is a positive return on investment (ROI): spend X dollars on security and save at least X in losses from attacks. The difficulty, however, is that it can be hard to compute ROI for a given approach. Consequently, security purchases and practices are often based on other factors such as industry best practices, fear of attack, product ratings, salesmanship, advise from consultants, budget restrictions, and so forth.
Quantitative measures, however, have proven effective for evaluating certain security options. Virtual private networks (VPNs) that run over the Internet, for example, have been shown to provide a cheaper means of protecting communications than separate leased lines. And research conducted by @stake Labs has shown that by following certain steps to harden network servers from attack, thruput on their sample networks improved by 1.93% to 3.28% on average. 29 As a third example, RTI International assessed the benefits of role-based access controls (RBAC) relative to alternative access control systems (e.g., lists of specific users authorized to access particular files). From their study, they projected a net present value of RBAC through 2006 of approximately $671 million. 30 The figure takes into account end-user's operational benefits as well as their implementation costs and research and development costs.
Economic incentives to invest in security will be influenced by liability and insurance factors. If organizations are held liable for attacks against third party systems that exploit easily avoidable weaknesses in their own, they will be driven to purchase better products and services from vendors and to follow better security practices internally. Similar effects are likely if insurance premiums are tied to the security posture of an organization. Standards and best practices will play an important role in establishing security baselines for negligence and insurance premiums.
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY
The growing rate of cyber attacks led many entrepreneurs to view the attacks not just as a threat, but also as a business opportunity. In 2000, the worldwide Internet security market reached $5.1 billion in revenue, according to market researcher IDC. This was a 33% increase over 1999. IDC projected that revenues would surpass $14 billion in 2005. 31 Industry is often accused of hyping the threat or overstating the benefits of their products in order to stimulate demand and increase business. However, the threat is real and serious. Moreover, it is aggravated by hackers, who attack systems and publish vulnerability information and hacking tools, in some cases as a way of getting jobs in the security industry and selling themselves as security consultants.
Until recently, security was not a priority for most organizations. Product selections were based more on factors such as cost, functionality, performance, and easeof-use than on security. Consequently, vendors could not make a business care for building secure products in an environment where cost and time-to-market were critical. This is changing, as security has become a higher priority.
The adoption of standards by government and industry groups affects the market by helping some products and vendors, while hurting others. For example, by selecting the Rijndahl encryption algorithm for its Advanced Encryption Standard, the U.S.
government pushed the market to favor Rijndahl over certain competing methods. De facto standards also matter, as when the industry began using SSL to encrypt web traffic.
Patents also affect the market. They stimulate innovation by offering inventors a means of protecting their work; this is the usual rationale for patents. They do more than that, however-patents also push companies to invent new technologies so as to avoid paying license fees for products protected by existing patents. In this regard, they stimulate innovation, but at a cost of decreased standardization and interoperability. Assurance. 32 Other programs are focused on research and development in security.
Internal funding within government agencies has also significantly impacted the security infrastructure. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), for example, has contributed numerous standards and guidelines for security, particularly in the area of cryptography, but in other areas as well. 33 The value of NIST to security developments was measured in the RTI study of role-based access control mentioned earlier. RTI found that NIST's contributions accounted for 44% of the benefits of RBAC.
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
The security infrastructure is driven in part by psychological factors. These are divided into two categories: intellectual and emotional. Both relate to why people get involved in security as attackers, defenders, and participants in policy debates.
INTELLECTUAL FACTORS
I was drawn to security primarily by intellectual interests. I wanted to find ways of making systems secure, not because I had sensitive information that needed to be protected, but because I found the problem to be intellectually challenging. I recognized that security was important for protecting against cyber threats, but I was not out to save the world from hackers and information thieves.
I expect that many people in the field were similarly motivated. I recall in the mid 1990s, during the heat of the debates over cryptography policy, a prominent government official remarked that it was impossible to control cryptography because of its intellectual appeal. He was right, of course.
The intellectual attraction of security comes not only from designing security mechanisms, but also from breaking them or just attempting to break them. This is fortunate, because it is not possible to build secure systems without understanding how they might be attacked. Security is an iterative process between finding and fixing vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an adversary. The downside is that the intellectual appeal of cracking systems also motivates the hackers. A survey of 164 hackers conducted by Nicholas Chantler of Queensland University of Technology in Brisbane, Australia found that the top two reasons for hacking were challenge and knowledge. 35 
EMOTIONAL FACTORS
People pursue security for emotional as well as intellectual reasons. They might enter the field because they see cyber threats as a serious threat to society or are paranoid of being a victim themselves. They might find that working in security gives them a feeling of satisfaction or self-esteem. They might recommend security purchases, funding, or legislation out of fear, uncertainty, or doubt (FUD) over the seriousness of the security threat. FUD is often cited when it appears that it is being used to promote an agenda that does not stand on its own merits.
Hackers also pursue their activities for emotional reasons. Chantler's study found that the number three reason for hacking was the pursuit of pleasure. After that came an assortment of emotional, social, and financial reasons, including recognition, excitement (of doing something illegal), friendship, self-gratification, addiction, espionage, theft, profit, vengeance, sabotage, and freedom. 36 If hacking had no intellectual or emotional appeal, it is unlikely we would have the serious problem we have today. Hackers may not be responsible for some of the most serious attacks, but they have contributed substantially to the base of knowledge and tools needed to carry out an attack. Of course, hackers alone cannot be blamed for this, because security professionals also publish information about security vulnerabilities on the grounds that doing so will lead to better security.
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS
The security infrastructure is shaped by social and political factors. This section describes four areas of influence: national security and public safety, privacy, information sharing, and international cooperation.
NATIONAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC SAFETY
Governments are responsible for the national security and public safety of their countries.
To address the cyber threats, they have adopted laws that criminalize cyber crimes and regulations mandating security in certain sectors, established organizations and programs that help with cyberspace defense, and allocated money for cyber defense research, education, and other programs.
In the United States, improving the security of critical infrastructures and One of the challenges facing all of these groups is that industry has been reluctant to share information out of concern for its confidentiality. In particular, companies are concerned that sensitive information provided voluntarily might not be adequately protected, or that it could be subject to 39 
INFORMATION SHARING
Information sharing, both publicly and within closed groups, has helped advance the science and practice of security, and increase knowledge and awareness about security.
While these effects are all positive, open publication has raised concerns about information getting into the hands of the "bad guys." Today, these concerns generally involve the publication of information about security vulnerabilities and of software tools that exploit those vulnerabilities. At one time they also included the publication of information relating to particular security technologies, most notably cryptography, but these concerns generally gave way to those recognizing the value of publishing such information so as to promote security.
The open publication of vulnerability information raises two issues: first, how much information should be made public, and second, when should publication take place. At one extreme, under a policy of full and immediate disclosure, all information about vulnerability, including any attack software that can be used to exploit it, is posted following its discovery. The rationale is that it forces vendors to fix problems while also keeping users informed. This is supported by numerous cases in which vendors did not fix problems until the vulnerability information was published.
At the other extreme, no information about vulnerability is posted, at least until the vendor has released a patch that fixes the problem; even then, only minimal information is disclosed. The argument in this case is that posting vulnerability information, particularly hacking tools, leads to attacks. Indeed, data reported to CERT/CC showed considerably heightened attack activity following the release of exploit tools associated with certain vulnerabilities. 40 The increased activity lasted many months beyond the release of the patches, as system administrators were slow to install the fixes. Publication of exploit software had a much greater impact than publication of vulnerability information alone, because it enabled script kiddies with little skill to launch attacks.
In between the extremes are policies that favor disclosing information about vulnerabilities, but generally not the attack tools, and giving vendors a grace period in which to release a patch before publication. The CERT/CC follows a policy giving vendors 45 days to fix their problem. 41 However, many security practitioners favor a shorter grace period. An April 2002 industry survey conducted by the Hurwitz group found that 39% of the more than 300 respondents favored disclosure immediately, with another 28% favoring disclosure within a week. However, only 13% favored posting "proof of concept" exploit software.
Although supporters of full disclosure make their argument on security grounds, they may be motivated as much by self-promotion as a desire to make systems more secure. Being first to publish can increase one's stature in the scientific, security, and hacking communities and lead to new business opportunities.
In general, it is lawful to publish exploit software, even though use of such software to conduct an actual attack is a crime. There are, however, exceptions. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act restricts the production, distribution, and use of software that circumvents copyright protection on the grounds that such software harms copyright owners.
The DMCA and its application has been challenged on First Amendment grounds.
In one highly publicized lawsuit, eight movie companies sued 2600 magazine for posting and linking to the DVD-descrambling program DeCSS. 42 After a federal district court ordered 2600 to remove the software and links from their website, the Electronic Frontier Association asked a federal appeals court to overturn the ruling. The EFF, which represents 2600, claimed that the ruling was an "unconstitutional constraint on free speech," because it blocked legitimate uses of DeCSS such as for educational purposes. The factors shaping the infrastructure include threats, technology trends, economic factors, psychological factors, and social and political factors. Examining these factors shows why security is a major problem today. Security threats, amplified by technology trends, have outpaced the economic and social case for developing and operating secure systems. However, that case has been building, stimulating rapid growth of the security infrastructure and lending hope that enough progress can be made to avoid a major catastrophe from a cyber attack against critical infrastructures. Just as the international community responded to the Y2K bug, which also threatened critical infrastructures, it may effectively respond to the security problems that still plague information systems. That security is now a high priority in both the public and private sector is encouraging. 
